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i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution provides that “[t]he President shall have Power
to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the
Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which
shall expire at the End of their next Session.” Art. II,
§ 2, cl. 3. The questions presented are:
1. Whether the President’s recess-appointment
power may be exercised during a recess that occurs
within a session of the Senate, or is instead limited to
recesses that occur between sessions of the Senate.
2. Whether the President’s recess-appointment
power may be exercised to fill vacancies that exist
during a recess, or is instead limited to vacancies that
first arose during that recess.
3. Whether the President’s recess-appointment
power may be exercised when the Senate is convening
every three days in pro-forma sessions.
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici are academics, political scientists, and
historians who focus their work on understanding
the Constitution of the United States and conveying
its meaning and underpinnings to students, fellow
academics, and the courts.1 These amici focus their
work on the original understanding of the Constitution at the time of the founding and write books and
articles that draw attention to that meaning. This
allows judges and litigators to wrestle with an understanding of the document as adopted—the meaning
that secures the text’s legitimacy as fundamental law.
Hadley P. Arkes is the Edward N. Ney Professor
of Jurisprudence and American Institutions at Amherst University and the Director of The James
Wilson Institute on Natural Rights and the American
Founding. He received his B.A. at the University of
Illinois and a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.
Professor Arkes has written numerous books and
articles addressing the American founding and been
called upon to testify before Congress on multiple
occasions.
1

Pursuant to Rule 37.6, the amici submitting this brief and
their counsel hereby represent that neither the parties to this
case nor their counsel authored this brief in whole or in part,
and that no person other than amici paid for or made a monetary contribution toward the preparation or submission of this
brief. Amici file this brief with the written consent from all
parties, copies of which are on file in the Clerk’s Office. All parties received timely notice of the professors’ intention to file this
brief.
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Joseph M. Bessette is the Alice Tweed Tuohy
Professor of Government and Ethics at Claremont
McKenna College. He has a B.S. from Boston College
and an M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.
Professor Bessette served as both a Deputy Director
(1985-1988) and an Acting Director (1988-1990) in the
U.S. Department of Justice. His expertise covers the
Presidency and American Constitutionalism and his
publications include Executive Power and the American Founding in SEPARATION OF POWERS AND GOOD
GOVERNMENT (1994) and editing THE PRESIDENCY IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: AN HISTORICAL EXAMINATION
(2010) AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENCY (2009).
David F. Forte is Professor of Law at Cleveland
State University and the inaugural holder of the
Charles R. Emrick, Jr.—Calfee Halter & Griswold
Endowed Chair. He holds a Ph.D. from the University
of Toronto and a J.D. from Columbia University.
Professor Forte previously served as chief counsel to
the United States delegation to the United Nations
and alternate delegate to the Security Council.
Professor Forte is widely published in the areas of
constitutional law and history. He is also Senior
Editor of THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION
(2006), a clause-by-clause analysis of the Constitution
of the United States.
Nelson Lund is University Professor at George
Mason University School of Law. He holds a Ph.D.
in political science from Harvard University and a
J.D. from the University of Chicago. He has published widely in the field of constitutional law and
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constitutional history. Before becoming a professor, he
served in the United States Department of Justice in
the Office of the Solicitor General (1985) and the
Office of Legal Counsel (1986-1987), and as Associate
Counsel to the President (1989-1992).
Jeremy A. Rabkin is Professor of Law at
George Mason University School of Law. He graduated from Cornell University with a B.A. and received
his Ph.D. from Harvard University. Professor Rabkin
serves on the Board of Directors of the U.S. Institute
of Peace and is familiar with the appointments process; he was originally appointed by President George
W. Bush in 2007, and then appointed for a second
term by President Barack Obama and reconfirmed by
the Senate in 2011. Professor Rabkin specializes in
early constitutional history and his articles have
appeared in major law reviews and political science
journals.
Ralph A. Rossum is the Salvatori Professor of
Political Philosophy and American Constitutionalism
at Claremont McKenna College. Professor Rossum
serves as an editor for many publications and is
annually recognized in both Who’s Who in America
and Who’s Who in the World. He received his B.A.
(summa cum laude) from Concordia College and
his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.
Professor Rossum focuses on the American Founding
and American Constitutionalism. He has written
numerous books and articles on the Constitution,
including UNDERSTANDING CLARENCE THOMAS: THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RESTORATION
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(forthcoming 2014), ANTONIN SCALIA’S JURISPRUDENCE:
TEXT AND TRADITION (2006), THE AMERICAN FOUNDING:
POLITICS, STATESMANSHIP, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1981),
and multiple volumes of the casebook AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
------------------------------------------------------------------

INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Recess Appointments Clause does not permit
the unilateral appointments to the NLRB made by
the President in this case. Those appointments—
made during a three-day “intra-session” break when
the Senate was meeting pro forma—are unique in the
history of the Republic. They are also the culmination of unnecessary and inappropriate Executive
overreaching. This overreaching has undermined a
valuable Senate prerogative in a manner unfathomable to the Founders and inconsistent with the design
of the Constitution.
The primary purpose of this brief is to show that
adhering to the original meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause has not and will not disrupt the
orderly governance of the Nation. The constitutionally
prescribed modes of appointment worked perfectly well
for a very long time, and modern circumstances make
it even easier to continue using the Constitution’s
procedures. Whether the clear text, structure, purpose, and history of the Constitution should give
way to “practical” considerations of the modern
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administrative state therefore cannot even be considered an issue in this case.
Notwithstanding a few relatively minor deviations
from the constitutional design, Presidents throughout
the first 160 years of our Nation’s history largely, and
certainly without insurmountable difficulties, adhered
to the textual and structural confines of the Appointments Clause and the Recess Appointments Clause
with which it is closely related. Their ability to abide
by the Constitution, even in sometimes very difficult
situations, provides a ready model for exercising the
Presidential-appointment power today.
------------------------------------------------------------------

ARGUMENT
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) invites this Court to sanction an unprecedented expansion of the President’s recess-appointments power.
The Court should decline that invitation for several
reasons.2

2

The D.C. Circuit concluded, primarily for textual reasons,
that both the vacancy and the appointment must take place
between the adjournment sine die (signaling the end of a
Session) and the beginning of the next Session. Pet. App. 51a52a. The two textual cues on which the D.C. Circuit focused are
“the Recess”—an apparent singling out of the one “inter-session”
recess—and “happen”—indicating that the vacancy must also
come about during the recess. Amici will not address those
rulings in detail because the parties (and no doubt other amici)
will do so extensively.
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First, the expansion is impermissible, inter alia,
because of the importance of maintaining the structural checks imposed by the general Appointments
Clause. Second, historical practice—even considering the recent expansion of the President’s recessappointment power that has accelerated over the last
30 years—further illustrates that the appointments
in question were ultra vires. Third, comparisons of
historical and current practice underscore that concerns about the practicality of enforcing the original
limits on the recess-appointment power—to the
extent such concerns may even be relevant—are
entirely misplaced. Enforcing the Recess Appointments Clause as written and as the Founders intended will hardly lead to a crisis in government. To the
contrary, Presidents successfully governed under
those constraints for the bulk of our Nation’s history—and, if anything, could more easily do so today.
I.

The Structure Of The Constitution Demonstrates That The President’s Intra-Session
Recess Appointments Were Unconstitutional

The Appointments Clause provides that the President “shall nominate, and, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint * * * Officers of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2. The Recess Appointments Clause, in contrast,
simply allows the President to “fill up all Vacancies
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate.”
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. The Appointments

7
Clause is the rule. The Recess Appointments Clause
is the exception. The exception was used here merely
to circumvent the rule.
A. The Recess Appointments Clause Must
Be Read Together With The Appointments Clause
The NLRB’s request for an exceedingly broad
construction of the Recess Appointments Clause
focuses extensively on the exception to the rule without confronting the rule itself. Pet. Br. 7, 19-20. But
the Recess Appointments Clause cannot be understood outside the larger context of appointments
generally. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, 3. The Recess
Appointments Clause immediately follows the general Appointments Clause in the Constitution as a
narrow alternative to the generally prescribed method, not as a separate track for political nominees
whom the President does not wish to put before the
Senate.
B. The Appointments Clause Restrains
The Executive From Exercising Unfettered Power Over Appointments
Throughout the Constitutional Convention, the
Framers sought to provide the government with
sufficient energy to deal with national concerns, but,
at the same time, they devised a number of checks
to limit the possibility of governmental corruption,
self-dealing, and favoritism. The Framers showed
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particular concern with Executive abuses in the appointments process. See, e.g., Luther Martin, Genuine Information, MARYLAND GAZETTE, Jan. 29, 1788,
reprinted in FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS: THE
DEBATE OVER THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
90 (John P. Kaminski and Richard Leffler eds., 1998)
(“[T]he person who nominates, will always in reality
appoint, and that this was giving the president a
power and influence which together with the other
powers, bestowed upon him, would place him above
all restraint and controul.”). Thus understandably,
they immediately rejected a proposal during the
Constitutional Convention to provide the appointment power to the President alone. Adam J. White,
Toward the Framers’ Understanding of “Advice and
Consent”: A Historical and Textual Inquiry, 29 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 116 (2005) (“First, they voted
on vesting the appointment power solely in the Executive. The motion failed.”).
The Appointments Clause alleviated concerns
over Executive abuse by reining in Executive power
in appointments. The Framers settled on a system
where the President selected officials who were
nonetheless subject to senatorial confirmation. Michael
A. Carrier, Note, When Is the Senate in Recess for
Purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause? 92
MICH. L. REV. 2204, 2225 (1993) (noting “[t]he Framers heatedly debated the general power of appointment” and “voiced great distrust of the executive and
expressed the need for checks and balances to
counteract the power of the President”). Alexander
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Hamilton explained in THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 that
the purpose of requiring the Senate’s advice and
consent is that “the necessity of their concurrence
would have a powerful, though, in general, a silent
operation” in that it would be “an excellent check
upon a spirit of favoritism” of the President. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 456 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Structurally, appointments were never intended
to be a unilateral endeavor. The Constitution explicitly “confided to the President and Senate jointly”
the power of appointment. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at
408 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis in original). In penning that description,
Hamilton was responding to Anti-Federalists who
claimed that the appointment power would lead to
abuse. Id. at 405 (“There is hardly any part of the
system which could have been attended with greater
difficulty in the arrangement of it than this; and
there is, perhaps, none which has been inveighed
against with less candor or criticized with less judgment.”). His goal was to highlight a limitation on
Executive power. If the Senate appears to some
Presidents as “obstructionist” on appointments at
times, that was the point.

10
C. The Recess Appointments Clause Is A
Narrow Exception Originally Designed
For Temporary Appointments Necessitated By Extremely Lengthy Delays
Between Congressional Sessions
The Recess Appointments Clause was designed
as a narrow exception to regular appointments to
address the specific problem of lengthy recesses
between sessions at the Founding. Id. at 408 (“[A]s it
would have been improper to oblige this body to be
continually in session for the appointment of officers,
and as vacancies might happen in their recess, * * *
the succeeding clause is evidently intended to authorize the President, singly, to make temporary appointments ‘during the recess of the Senate, by
granting commissions which shall expire at the end of
their next session.’ ” (emphasis in original)). In the
early years under the Constitution, the nature of the
country and the technology of the time made travel
and communication difficult. “[I]ntersession recesses
typically lasted between six and nine months and
therefore recess appointments were needed to prevent
important offices from remaining unfilled during
these long periods.” Michael B. Rappaport, The
Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause,
52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1491 (2004) (hereinafter
Rappaport, Original Meaning).
This exception to the appointment process was
never intended to swallow the rule. Significantly, the
Framers adopted the Recess Appointments Clause
without debate. Carrier, 92 MICH. L. REV. at 2225.
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In contrast, the general Appointments Clause was
the subject of intense scrutiny during the public debates over ratification. Alexander Hamilton responded
directly to its critics who charged that the President
had unchecked appointment powers, countering that
“writers against the Constitution” tend to “misrepresent[ ] ” such powers in order to prey on “the aversion
of the people to monarchy * * * * ” FEDERALIST NO. 67,
at 405.
Hamilton went on to explain that “[t]he relation
in which [the Recess Appointments] clause stands to
the [Appointments Clause], which declares the general mode of appointing officers of the United States,
denotes it to be nothing more than a supplement to
the other for the purpose of establishing an auxiliary
method of appointment, in cases to which the general
method was inadequate.” Id. at 408 (emphasis added). Hamilton made clear that the Recess Appointments Clause “is to be considered as supplementary”
to the Appointments Clause. Ibid.
Debates over the Senate’s role in advising and
consenting to Presidential nominees remained an
important, unresolved issue even after ratification.
The First Congress debated vigorously whether the
President had the power to remove a Presidential
appointee without the Senate’s consent. The Senate
“jealously guarded its prerogatives” and “[m]any
senators simply assumed that because they consented
to the appointment of executive officers they likewise
had to consent to their removal.” GORDON S. WOOD,
EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC,
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1789-1815, 87-88 (2009). “The Senate was evenly divided on the issue; only after Vice-President Adams’s
tie-breaking vote did it concede the right of the president to remove executive officials without its advice
and consent.” Ibid. (emphasis added).
In this historical context of vigorous debate over
the necessity and scope of the general Appointments
Clause, it is unimaginable that the Framers would
have enacted the Recess Appointments Clause—
without any debate—while simultaneously intending
that it provide an enormously broad grant to the
President to evade the advice-and-consent requirement. That scenario would have run counter to the
very purpose of the Appointments Clause.
II.

The NLRB Appointments Are Fundamentally Inconsistent With Historical Practice

The history of Presidential exercise of the recessappointments power does not support the NLRB
appointments in this case. Far from it. Instead, it
shows a long tradition of virtually uniform adherence
to the original meaning of the Recess Appointments
Clause—with Presidents regularly departing from
that tradition only over the past 30 years or so.
A. Recess Appointments From 1789-1823:
Strict Adherence To Original Meaning
During the founding era of the Republic, the
original meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause,
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informed by the Appointments Clause, controlled its
use by the Executive Branch. Presidents used the
recess-appointment power to fill vacancies that arose
during the inter-session recess, and any recess appointments occurred during that time as well. This
was confirmed by the earliest official opinion to be
offered on the subject.
In 1792, the first Attorney General of the United
States concluded that a vacancy occurred when
Congress created a new office but that, since the
vacancy arose during the session of Congress (not the
recess), it could not be filled with a recess appointment. Edmund Randolph, Opinion on Recess Appointments (July 7, 1792), in 24 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 165-67 (John Catanzariti et al.
eds., 1990). The authoritativeness of Randolph’s
views is only enhanced by the role he played in drafting and ratifying the Constitution. President Washington relied upon Randolph’s interpretation in
making his own appointments, noting that the recess
appointments he made were for “offices having become vacant since [the Senate’s] last session.” Exec.
S. Journal, 2d Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1791); see also id.
at 38 (1790) (listing vacancies that occurred “during
the late recess of the Senate”).
Alexander Hamilton, too, wrote that “[i]t is clear
* * * the President cannot fill a vacancy which happens during a session of the Senate.” Letter from
Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (May 3,
1799), in 23 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 94
(Harold C. Syrett ed., 1976). This confirmed his
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previous position that the “auxiliary method of [recess] appointment” was available to the Executive
only because “it would have been improper to oblige
[the Senate] to be continually in session for the
appointment of officers [but] vacancies might happen
in their recess, which it might be necessary for the
public service to fill without delay.” FEDERALIST NO.
67, at 408 (emphasis in original). At their inception,
then, recess appointments were at most a stop-gap
measure for dealing with narrow circumstances in
which they are “necessary for the public service.” As
the language of the Constitution clearly implies, they
were not understood to be tools for avoiding the
advice-and-consent requirement whenever the President found that requirement inconvenient.
Indeed, early Presidents viewed Senate confirmation as an integral part of the vetting process itself—
not something to circumvent. George Washington
evidenced this in his first nomination after becoming
President (as recorded in the Senate Executive Journal): William Short as a temporary replacement for
Thomas Jefferson as Minister at the Court of France.
Washington sent a letter to the Senate cordially
requesting “advice on the propriety of appointing
[Short]” and offering “papers which [would] acquaint
[Senate members] with [Short’s] character.” Exec. S.
Journal, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1789).
And while the Senate regularly consented to
Washington’s nominations, it was not the “rubber
stamp” one might imagine. One of President Washington’s earliest nominees—Benjamin Fishbourn,
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nominated for Naval Officer of the Port of Savannah—was rejected by the Senate even though he was
someone about whom the President felt quite strongly. See id. at 16-17 (1789). In keeping with his
understanding of the joint nature of appointments,
Washington then sent a letter about Fishbourn,
suggesting that the Senate permit him to provide
further information moving forward in situations
“where the propriety of nominations appear questionable to you.” Id. at 16.
It is also clear that early Presidents did not use
recess appointments to by-pass the Senate when
consent would be lacking. When it came to recess
appointments, Washington viewed them merely as a
temporary measure that, if possible, would be permanently fixed as soon as the Senate was back in session. Thus in informing the Senate of the very first
set of recess appointments in the Nation’s history,
President Washington was quick to point out that
“[t]hese appointments will expire with your present
session, and indeed ought not to last longer than until
others can be regularly made.” Id. at 38 (1790) (emphasis added).
Between 1789 and 1823, Presidents Washington,
Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe together
made well over 4,000 recess appointments.3 The
3

Unfortunately, it is impossible to compile a complete and
wholly accurate record of recess appointments before 1965. See
generally Carrier, 92 MICH. L. REV. at 2209 n.31. Between 1789
and 1823, for example, recess appointments were not recorded in
(Continued on following page)
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Recess Appointments Clause was used only to fill
vacancies that arose during an inter-session recess
and no appointments were made during intra-session
adjournments.4
The Madison Administration’s use of recess
appointments is particularly powerful historical
evidence that enforcing the Recess Appointments
Clause’s limitations on Executive power will not lead
to any breakdown in governance. President Madison
faced an unprecedented challenge during the War of
1812—a conflict in which British troops not only
occupied Washington, D.C., but also burned the
the Senate Executive Journal unless the President chose to
nominate the recess appointee for a regular appointment once
the Senate was back in session. See, e.g., Exec. S. Journal, 2d
Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67 (1791). Additionally, in the early years of
the Republic, the President was occasionally ambiguous in his
messages to Congress regarding recess appointments. Thus,
while there are notices accompanying groups of nominations
stating that certain recess appointments were made during the
last recess of the Senate, it is not always clear whether all of the
nominations in the group were given recess appointments. See,
e.g., Exec. S. Journal, 3d Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (1794) (“I nominate
the following persons to fill the offices respectively annexed to
their names, some of which became vacant during the recess of
the Senate.”).
4
The first intra-session break took place December 23-30,
1800, during the Second Session of the Sixth Congress. 2012
Congressional Directory 522. During that break, President
Adams made one nomination—Louis Tousard, to be Inspector of
Artillery—on Christmas Eve, December 24th. Upon returning,
the Senate treated it as a December 30th nomination and
confirmed Tousard on December 31st. Exec. S. Journal, 6th
Cong., 2d Sess. 364 (1800).
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Executive Mansion and the Capitol. Nonetheless,
Madison made all necessary appointments without
using recess appointments while the Senate was in
session.
Madison made over 3,000 inter-session
recess appointments, including more than 2,500
military appointments and promotions, and handled
other appointments via advice and consent. See
Exec. S. Journal, 11th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1809)
through 18th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1817). Madison’s
example confirms that even under extraordinary
circumstances, enforcing the original meaning of the
Recess Appointments Clause is entirely consistent
with the Executive’s responding effectively to complex
and demanding challenges.
B. Recess Appointments From 1823-1921:
Positions Vacated Before The Recess
1. Rise Of The “Happen to Exist” Construction
The first shift away from the original meaning of
the Recess Appointment Clause came in 1823 with an
opinion by Attorney General William Wirt. Wirt was
tasked with addressing when a vacancy must “happen” to come under the Recess Appointments Clause.
From a textual standpoint, he admitted that the
vacancy should “arise” during the recess. His opinion,
however, was based on what he thought was required
by the “reason and spirit” of the Constitution—and he
concluded that the vacancy could be one that “happen[ed] to exist” during the recess. Executive Authority to Fill Vacancies, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 631, 632 (1823)
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(hereinafter Wirt Op.). In Wirt’s view, the vacancy
could potentially arise at any point before the recess
and still be eligible for Executive appointment without Senate confirmation—a perfect contradiction of
Attorney General Randolph’s opinion just 30 years
earlier.
In the century after this first interpretive stretching of the Recess Appointments Clause, thousands of
recess appointments were made to fill vacancies that
occurred both during and before the recess of the Senate. Importantly, however, the recess-appointment
power was still not used—with two notable exceptions discussed in the next section—to make appointments during intra-session adjournments.
In reality, though, it is unclear that the “happen
to exist” interpretation offered by General Wirt was
widely accepted over the “happen to arise” interpretation that previously governed. It appears to have
been a disputed issue both at that time and for at
least another century. For example, just two years
after Wirt’s opinion, the Senate considered a resolution:
That the President of the United States does
not, constitutionally, possess either the right
or the power to appoint ambassadors, or other public ministers, but with the advice and
consent of the Senate, except when vacancies
may happen in the recess.
Exec. S. Journal, 19th Cong., 1st Sess. 467 (1825).
The resolution’s language is close to the text of the
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Recess Appointments Clause itself, but the use of
“when vacancies may happen in the recess” (as
opposed to “all Vacancies that may happen during the
Recess”) arguably points to the Senate continuing to
subscribe to the “happen to arise” construction.
Further evidence of the disputed nature of General Wirt’s interpretation may be seen in the first
version of 5 U.S.C. § 5503—the statute limiting the
conditions under which recess appointees may be
paid—that was passed in 1863. The limitations it
enforces make it “appear[ ] that this statute was
enacted based on the Senate’s view that the Constitution adopted the arise interpretation.” Rappaport,
Original Meaning, at 1543 n.173. A Senate report
from that same Congress also defended the “arise”
view. Ibid. As recently as 1940, Congress was still
using this statute to implicitly rebut the presumption
that recess appointments could be made to fill vacancies that occurred during a session of the Senate.
Michael B. Rappaport, Why Nonoriginalism Does Not
Justify Departing from the Original Meaning of the
Recess Appointments Clause, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK
(www.ssrn.com) (forthcoming late 2013) (hereinafter
Rappaport, Nonoriginalism).
Additionally, key
Attorney General opinions throughout the Nineteenth Century and court cases in the 1860s strongly
support the original “happen to arise” construction.
Ibid.
Structurally, the shift from “happen to arise”
to “happen to exist” may be less problematic than
the Executive’s later claim of a power to make
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intra-session recess appointments. See Part II.C.
infra. General Wirt argued that the “substantial
purpose of the [C]onstitution was to keep these offices
filled; and powers adequate to this purpose were
intended to be conveyed.” Wirt Op. 632. True enough,
but the Constitution was designed to protect the
people from dubious appointments, not just to keep
offices filled with whomever a President most prefers.
That is why the Recess Appointments Clause was
written to protect the normal advice-and-consent
requirement of the Appointments Clause.
That said, Wirt’s “happen to exist” interpretation
at least seems to involve less of a purposeful dodge of
Senate confirmation than making recess appointments while the Senate is still very much in session.
Nevertheless, straying from the constitutional text in
this respect only made it that much easier for later
Presidents to expand the recess-appointment power
well beyond textual, structural, and historical
bounds—culminating in the unprecedented appointments at issue in this case.
2. Continued Rejection Of Intra-Session
Recess Appointments
Even while the meaning of “happen” was being
debated, recess appointments continued to be made
only during inter-session recesses. The two exceptions that prove the rule also occurred during this
period.
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First are President Johnson’s 1867-1868 recess
appointments during extended intra-session breaks of
the Senate. Although Johnson’s appointments run
contrary to the text, original meaning, and purpose of
the Clause, they should be viewed as anomalies
rather than any sort of general shift in the separationof-powers firmament. Indeed, they are sui generis in
the first 130 years of the Republic.
In 1867, Congress was in session from March 4th
until December 1st but took a two-and-a-half month
break from late April to early July and a four-month
break from late July to late November. Congress
followed a similar schedule the next year, taking
several longer intra-session breaks. Before that time,
however, Congress had only taken eleven intrasession breaks of more than three days in the entire
history of the Nation. Each break occurred around
Christmas time and none was longer than a few
weeks.
The “intra-session” breaks taken by the 40th
Congress likely appeared to President Johnson as
actual recesses of the Senate. Indeed, the first of the
lengthy intra-session adjournments began when a
Special Session, called during April of 1867, adjourned sine die, the normal signal for the end of a
congressional session. Additionally, after Johnson’s
impeachment and trial in 1868, the president pro
tempore used language to begin an adjournment that
sounded like the language normally used to end a
session. Rappaport, Nonoriginalism.
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This also explains Johnson’s actions with regard
to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton. Indeed, one of
the articles on which President Johnson was impeached dealt with his treatment of Stanton. See
Article I, Proceedings of the Senate Sitting for the
5
Trial of Andrew Johnson. President Johnson suspended Stanton during Congress’s second long adjournment of 1867. But according to a provision of
the Tenure of Office Act—a law designed specifically
to protect Stanton—the President could only suspend
cabinet members without congressional approval
when Congress was out of session. Tenure of Office
Act, 14 Stat. 430 (1867). Johnson later removed
Stanton from office so that he could challenge the
constitutionality of the Act. Although the second long
break in 1867 did not begin with “session-ending”
language, Johnson’s actions—i.e., suspending Stanton
and recess-appointing William Gould as paymaster of
the Army—may simply signal that Johnson viewed
the unusual breaks taking place during those years
as inter-session recesses.6
5

Available at http://www.nps.gov/anjo/historyculture/article-i.

htm.
6

Johnson made the appointment during the second long
break without reference to the adjournment being intra-session.
The Court of Claims later held that Gould had been validly appointed during what it called an intra-session recess. Gould v.
United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 593 (1884). That language, however,
was admittedly dicta, id. at 596, and Attorney General Knox
later concluded that Gould’s appointment should not be taken
as precedential. President—Appointment of Officers—Holiday
Recess, 23 Op. Att’y Gen. 599, 602-03 (1901).

23
Perhaps the strongest reason for treating Johnson’s recess appointments as anomalous is that there
is no indication that anyone debated the constitutionality of the appointments at that time—and that is
striking when one considers the hostilities that were
taking place between Congress and the President.
The unusual nature of President Johnson’s
appointments was not addressed until 30 years later
when Attorney General Philander Knox considered
the question of intra-session recess appointments in
1901. He stated simply that “[t]he public circumstances surrounding [the 1867-1868] state of affairs
were unusual and involved results which should not
be viewed as precedents.” 23 Op. Att’y Gen. at 603.
In General Knox’s view, the appointments were
contrary to both “the uniform practice of the Executive and the various opinions of [his] predecessors.”
Ibid. General Knox highlighted the difference in the
Constitution between “the Recess” and an intrasession “adjournment” in setting forth the “irresistible”
conclusion that “the President is not authorized” to
make an intra-session appointment. Id. at 604.
Furthermore, he confirmed that “[a]ny immediate
temporary adjournment is not [a constitutional]
recess, although it may be a recess in the general and
ordinary use of that term.” Id. at 601.
The second set of exceptions that prove the rule
are President Theodore Roosevelt’s on December 7,
1903. The Senate ended a special session that day
and then immediately began a regular session.
President Roosevelt caused a good deal of controversy
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by claiming that the very short period of time between the two sessions amounted to a “constructive
recess” and making recess appointments based on
that assumption. The Infinitesimal Recess, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1903, at 8. His actions prompted the
Senate Judiciary Committee to prepare a report on
what constitutes a recess of the Senate in which it
soundly rejected any notion of a “constructive recess.”
S. Rep. No. 4389, 58th Cong., 3d Sess., reprinted in 39
Cong. Rec. 3823, 3824 (1905). It is not only the
immediate backlash to his actions, though, that show
how political actors interpreted the Recess Appointments Clause at that time. It is also the fact that
President Roosevelt at least evidenced a regard for
the understood meaning of the rule in his formalistic
attempt to dodge the textual mandate by styling the
break as a “constructive recess.” One thing remained
clear: intra-session recess appointments were anathema.
C. Recess Appointments From 1921-2012:
The Executive’s Shift Toward IntraSession Recess Appointments
After 132 years of settled opinion on the matter,
Attorney General Harry Daughtery adopted a novel
interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause in
1921, advocating a “practical” interpretation of “recess.” Contrary to General Knox’s earlier opinion,
Daughtery interpreted the 1905 Senate report to
conclude that advice and consent need not be obtained when the Senate is “absent so that it cannot
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receive communications from the President or participate as a body in making appointments.” Executive
Power—Recess Appointments, 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 20,
25 (1921). While the Senate had appeared to indicate
that functional inability to respond to the President
was a necessary condition for a recess, Daughtery
appeared to take it as a sufficient one. Thus for the
first time in the Nation’s history, there was a legal
opinion suggesting Presidents might make “intrasession recess appointments” if the Senate took an
extended break.7
But with the exception of President Harding’s
four appointments in reliance on the Daughtery
opinion, the practice of recess appointments did not
change significantly until many years later.8
7

It is possible that Daughtery may actually have been
arguing for a “modified intersession” recess in which any
lengthy period during which the Senate cannot offer advice and
consent becomes a functional intersession recess. Understanding those long breaks as legitimate recesses, much as it seems
President Johnson interpreted Congress’s actions in 1867-1868,
would be supported by the length that the recess appointee
stayed in office. In the years following Daughtery’s opinion, the
recess appointment would only last until the end of the session
when the Senate returned, not the end of some future session.
This lends credence to the idea that both the Executive Branch
and Congress viewed these “intra-session” appointments, Pet.
Br. at 9a-12a, as “inter-session” even though there was no sine
die adjournment. Rappaport, Nonoriginalism.
8
Even Daughtery concluded that no one would think a twoor three-day adjournment constituted a practical recess. In fact,
he thought a break of even five to ten days would probably not
meet the “practical” test he invented. 33 Op. Att’y Gen. at 25.
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In 1928, President Coolidge did appoint John
Esch as commissioner of the Interstate Commerce
Commission during a 13-day recess.9 Notably, the
Senate rejected Esch’s nomination during the following session and his commission ended at the end of
the formal session—an indication that the adjournment during which Esch was appointed was treated
as an inter-session recess. Clarence A. Miller, The
Interstate Commerce Commissioners: The First Fifty
Years: 1887-1937, 5 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 580, 665
(1936).
Thus from 1789 to the 1940s, there were virtually no intra-session recess appointments, and the few
that were made each had unusual facts: (1) Johnson’s
during the controversies of 1867-1868; (2) Harding’s
short appointments in 1921 that were quickly confirmed; and (3) Coolidge’s appointment of Esch and
Hoover’s promotions and appointments, which appear
to have been viewed as inter-session appointments.
It was not until 1947 that Presidents began
making intra-session recess appointments with more
regularity. President Truman made 20 recess appointments over four intra-session adjournments.
9

Several officers received promotions—technically these
are new appointments—under President Hoover, and he also
made some appointments to the Federal Farm Board in 1929.
These appointments, however, took place during a special
Executive-called session and so might also have been considered
to be outside the normal session of Congress. If so, it was
functionally an inter-session recess.
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President Eisenhower followed his lead, making nine
appointments during intra-session adjournments.
President Nixon made eight such appointments,
President Carter made 17, and President Reagan
made 73. Presidents since Reagan have made intrasession recess appointments with more or less frequency.
Importantly, however, there has been no congressional acquiescence in this practice. On the contrary,
Congress has attempted to rein in Presidents’ ultra
vires exercise of the recess-appointment power by
taking such steps as limiting the circumstances under
which appointees get paid and using pro forma sessions to block appointments. On the whole, the
Senate appears zealous—and indeed part of Petitioners’ argument is that the Senate is too zealous—to
guard its advice and consent role.
In 1823, Attorney General Wirt—who presided
over the first expansion of the Clause—speculated
that the exception would swallow the rule only if one
“imput[ed] to the President a degree of turpitude
entirely inconsistent with the character which his
office implies.” Wirt Op. 634. Wirt was mistaken.
The acceleration in intra-session recess appointments
over the last 30 years shows the need, instead, to
heed Madison’s admonition: “If men were angels, no
government would be necessary * * * * [But] in framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great difficulty lies in * * * oblig[ing] it
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to control itself.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
The appointments at issue here—made during
pro forma sessions of the Senate—although unprecedented, are nonetheless symptomatic of the expansion of the recess-appointments power that has
primarily occurred over the past 30 years. Seizing
upon the language of the Daughtery opinion, the
Office of Legal Counsel informed President Obama
in early 2012 that “the convening of periodic pro
forma sessions in which no business is to be conducted does not have the legal effect of interrupting an
intrasession recess otherwise long enough to qualify
as a ‘Recess of the Senate’ under the Recess Appointments Clause.” Lawfulness of Recess Appointments
During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding
Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, ___ Op. O.L.C. ___,
2012 WL 168645, at *19 (Jan. 6, 2012) (hereinafter
OLC Memo).
Pro forma sessions have been historically understood to defeat recess appointments.
Henry B.
Hogue, Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions, Congressional Research Service, 10 (Jan. 9,
2012) (noting the Senate’s use of its power to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings”—under Article I,
§ 5, clause 2 of the Constitution—to conduct
pro forma sessions that would frustrate President
George W. Bush’s use of the recess-appointments
power). Congress is in session and, therefore, neither
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chamber can be absent for more than three days
without the consent of the other.10
Acting on the advice of the OLC Memo, President
Obama made recess appointments during one of the
three-day pro forma sessions. Thus for the first time
in the Nation’s history, a President made intrasession recess appointments even though the Senate
was “in session” in a manner that made the members
of Congress believe the Adjournments Clause was
satisfied.
III. History Confirms That Adhering To The
Original Meaning Of The Recess Appointments Clause Is No Barrier To Good
Governance
This Court has repeatedly explained that the
original meaning of the Constitution at the time of
ratification is the guide for its interpretation today.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35
(2008) (“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the
scope they were understood to have when the people
adopted them.”); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37
U.S. 657, 721 (1838) (recognizing that the meaning of
10

In this instance, Senate leaders asked the House to
prevent the appointments by not agreeing to the Senate’s
adjournment. This did not allow for an amount of time to pass
that would traditionally be understood as long enough to count
as a functional recess. Pet. Br. 56. The appointments here were
thus unprecedented even under Petitioners’ theory of recess
appointments.
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the Constitution “must necessarily depend on the
words of the constitution [and] the meaning and
intention of the convention which framed and proposed it for adoption and ratification to the conventions * * * in the several states”).
Some have objected, however, that fidelity to
original meaning must yield to the exigencies of a
changing world. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE
LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010). In the instant case,
however, that debate is beside the point. If anything,
it is even easier today for the Executive to operate
within the constitutional constraints imposed by the
Founders than it was in earlier times. Even then,
Presidents managed to govern effectively within
those constraints—sometimes under trying circumstances, as discussed above. And not a single one of
the Executive departures from the Constitution’s
requirements can plausibly be seen as necessary for
the public good.
To be sure, in the modern administrative state,
the number of political appointments requiring Senate confirmation has increased. But at the Founding,
too, Presidents were responsible for an exceedingly
large number of appointments—and still managed to
make them when the Senate was in session (under
the Appointments Clause) or between sessions when
a vacancy arose (under the Recess Appointments
Clause). President Washington, for example, appointed numerous ensigns and other low-level officers
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with which a modern President is not concerned.11
The process was streamlined for Washington by the
Secretary of War presenting Washington with long
lists of officer nominations that could then be offered
to the Senate for consideration without much effort.
Even so, the appointments were not left solely to
Executive Branch discretion—not all of the streamlined nominations were approved. See Part II.A.
supra.
To allow modern Presidents to do an end-run
around the original meaning of the Appointments
Clause (and thus to evade its constraints) threatens
the very dangers that concerned the Founders and
that consumed the ratification debates. And it is
unnecessary besides. If anything, there is even less
reason today than at the Founding to be concerned
with the workability of enforcing the limits reasonably
imposed by the Founders on the President’s recessappointment power.
First and foremost, it is simply much easier in
our time to convene the Senate. Today’s Senate
meets regularly and can reconvene on very short
notice if necessary. Furthermore, the Secretary of the
Senate can receive messages concerning nominations
from the President at any point during a Congress
and deal with them appropriately. See, e.g., 149
Cong. Rec. S8 (Jan. 7, 2003). If it was unnecessary
11

See 10 U.S.C. § 624 (allowing O1-O3 commissions to
operate outside the advice and consent of the Senate).
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for President Adams to recess appoint his nominee
during the first intra-session break in the Senate’s
history—when the Senate could not be called upon for
advice and consent—it is unnecessary for a modern
nomination to be forced through when the Senate
could be called upon to act. The nominee can easily
be considered upon the Senate’s return. See note 4
supra.
Second, the Senate’s vetting process can be
expedited considerably in the modern age because
candidates can be available by telephone or email in
an instant, and can usually interview in person
almost immediately. Nominations must simply be
made far enough in advance to ensure a hearing
while the Senate is in session (or non-controversial
enough to be expedited quickly near the end of a
session). Indeed, the current Administration has
already selected a nominee to fill a U.S. District
Court position in Maryland even though that position
will not be vacant until February of next year.12 But
vacancies can languish for extended periods before
the President makes a selection for the office. On
average, a modern President will take 5 to 6
months to make a nomination; some positions wait
for a nominee for 15 months or more. Rappaport,
12

See Press Release, White House, President Obama Nominates Two to Serve on the United States District Courts (Sept.
25, 2013) (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2013/09/25/president-obama-nominates-two-serve-united-statesdistrict-courts).
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Nonoriginalism, at 13-14. This contrasts with early
Presidents working to prevent gaps—even to the
point of obtaining pre-recess advice and consent for
individuals uninformed of their own nomination.
With advance planning, the Senate could be called
13
upon to expedite appointments once again.
Third, individuals may be appointed—with the
consent of Congress—to serve temporarily in a position if the need is urgent. Federal Vacancies Reform
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3345 (2012). Someone from within the
department can occupy a vacancy for a short time
until an actual appointment is made. In this way,
Congress allows for the government to continue
operating even in emergency or unforeseeable situations—and Presidents can keep offices filled whatever
the Senate’s reasons are for not confirming nominees.14

13

Further evidence is the Senate’s recent decision to
disallow filibusters for Presidential nominations except to this
Court. THE WASHINGTON POST, “Reid, Democrats trigger ‘nuclear’ option; eliminate most filibusters on nominees,” available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to-limitfilibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/
2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html.
Whatever the merits or ramifications of that decision, it shows
that the political branches have room to maneuver within
constitutional confines when it comes to appointments.
14
For example, President Obama has already filled 560
vacancies using the Act. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office,
Federal Vacancies Submissions, http://www.gao.gov/legal/
fedvac/searchcurr.html (search by administration to locate
specific results).

34
That Congress did not provide for acting NLRB
members, see 5 U.S.C. § 3349c(1)(a), cannot, of
course, justify departing from the original meaning of
the Recess Appointments Clause. If anything, it only
confirms that Congress can, when it chooses, act to
streamline the appointments process. After all, other
multi-member bodies have received congressional
approval for the appointment of acting members.
Congressional inaction with respect to the NLRB, in
particular, implies that Congress viewed the advice
and consent requirement for that body as of higher
importance than the “need” to fill spots on the Board.
Given the highly political nature of the NLRB, it is
unsurprising that Congress would want to ensure
that its members were subject to Senate approval.
Today, it is difficult to conceive of any emergency
that would necessitate an intra-session appointment.
And this is true even if the Senate were prevented,
for some reason, from reconvening or considering
a nominee for a few days. Suppose a sudden death
presented a vacancy in the armed services or in
the ranks of an agency that needed to act in a
time-sensitive manner. A successor from within the
ranks—as a temporary or acting appointment—
could be appointed to ensure the continuity of the
organization. The reality, however, is that the recessappointments power has been used (inappropriately)
to by-pass the advice-and-consent requirement to fill
vacancies that have been open for months or even
years—belying any argument that an expansive
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interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause is
necessary to prevent a breakdown in governance.
In sum, if President Madison could keep vacancies filled during the War of 1812 when a foreign
power captured the capital (and burned much of it)
without resort to intra-session recess appointments,
today’s Presidents can certainly do the same. Not
only is the original meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause practicably enforceable today, but the
concerns about executive irresponsibility that motivated the Framers have hardly faded into oblivion.
Consider the events now infamously known as
the Saturday Night Massacre. On October 20, 1973,
Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy
Attorney General William Ruckelshaus both resigned
rather than carrying out President Nixon’s order to
fire independent special prosecutor Archibald Cox.
Richardson and Ruckelshaus had given assurances to
the House Judiciary Committee that they would not
interfere with Cox’s work. More specifically, Richardson promised the Senate—in his confirmation hearings—that he would only fire the special prosecutor
for malfeasance in office. That sort of oversight of
appointments thus played a direct and substantial
role in the events that unfolded—and the absence of
such oversight, which always occurs with recess
appointments, might have retarded the unraveling of
the Watergate scandal.
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Thus to whatever extent enforcing fidelity to the
original meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause
would require changing current practice, the Founders would likely view such changes as entirely salutary. And they would be right. The Constitution was
not designed to make life as easy as possible for
Presidents. The fact that Presidents in the last few
decades have tried to read the Constitution to increase their own power does not make it so.
------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
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